An Assessment of EU-China and EU-Japan Political and Security Relations : Moving the `Strategic Partnerships' Beyond the Rhetoric Trap by Iglesias, Just Castillo
Osaka University
Title
An Assessment of EU-China and EU-Japan Political and
Security Relations : Moving the `Strategic Partnerships'
Beyond the Rhetoric Trap
Author(s)Iglesias, Just Castillo
Citation国際公共政策研究. 17(1) P.159-P.178
Issue Date2012-09
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/25998
DOI
Rights
 159
	 	 	 ＊	PhD	Candidate,	Osaka	School	of	International	Public	Policy,	Osaka	University.
An	Assessment	of	EU-China	and	EU-Japan		
Political	and	Security	Relations :
Moving	the	‘Strategic	Partnerships’	Beyond	the	Rhetoric	Trap
Just	Castillo	Iglesias＊
Abstract
	 The	European	Union’s	(EU)	relevance	in	East-Asian	political	and	security	issues,	having	been	developed	
for	the	last	two	decades,	remains	limited	and	low-profile.	Keeping	focus	on	assessing	the	EU’s	‘Strategic	
Partnerships’	with	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(China)	and	Japan	from	the	aspect	of	political	and	
security	relations,	this	article	will	first	discuss	the	different	elements	leading	to	the	parallel	development	
of	a	series	of	gaps	between	the	objectives	set	for	cooperation	and	their	materialization	into	actual	action	or	
joint-policy;	and	secondly,	address	 the	question	of	whether	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	a	European	‘umbrella’	
strategy	for	East-Asia	and	the	fact	that	both	Strategic	Partnerships	are	dealt	with	in	isolation,	the	EU’s	
involvement	in	the	region	is	most	likely	to	remain	low	unless	a	different	standpoint	is	adopted.	
	 Furthermore,	and	considering	the	nature	and	causes	of	such	gaps,	this	article	will	discuss	the	upcoming	
challenges	in	the	analysis	of	the	EU’s	engagement	with	East	Asia	today,	which	can	be	summarized	in	two	
main	aspects:	 first,	 that	 the	perceptions	 that	 the	EU	generates	 in	each	of	 the	Partners	should	not	be	
considered	a	minor	aspect	of	such	relations	but	a	crucial	one	to	understand	its	dynamics	and	complexities;	
and	secondly,	 the	fact	 that	Japan-EU	and	China-EU	Strategic	Partnerships	might	be	better	understood	
through	the	lens	of	inter-regionalism	instead	of	being	seen	as	‘normal’	bilateral	relations,	as	is	the	case	
with	most	of	the	exishing	literature.
Keywords : 	EU,	CFSP,	Japan,	China,	PRC,	Strategic,	Partnership,	rhetoric,	security	
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INTRODUCTION
	 With	the	establishment	of	the	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	(CFSP)	with	the	Maastricht	Treaty	of	
1992,	 the	 later	formulation	of	 the	European	Security	Strategy	(ESS)	in	2003,	 through	which	the	Member	
States	articulated	a	common	vision	for	the	EU	as	an	international	actor,	and	the	most	recent	creation	of	the	
European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS)	with	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	the	EU	has	been	consolidating	its	emerging	
role	as	a	global	political	and	security	actor.	
	 The	EU’s	Foreign	Policy	vision	is	based	on	the	promotion	of	effective	multilateralism	and	of	what	the	Union	
considers	as	universal	public	goods	for	the	objective	of	human	security:	good	governance,	integration	in	a	
wide	range	of	international	organizations,	fora	and	regimes,	respect	for	human	rights,	democracy,	promotion	
of	peace	and	development.	For	the	advancement	along	these	objectives,	 the	EU	primarily	adopts	a	value-
based	diplomacy,	i.e.	the	promotion	of	European	values	as	universally	applicable	and	desirable,	making	use	of	
conditionality	mechanisms,	most	notably	with	the	incentive	of	aid	in	its	relations	with	the	ACP1）	countries	and	
with	the	prospect	of	membership	in	the	case	of	its	neighborhood.	In	relation	to	third	countries	considered	of	
high	relevance,	the	EU	envisages	so-called	‘Strategic	Partnerships’,	with	the	same	objective	of	consolidating	
its	bid	for	effective	multilateralism	and	an	institution-	and	norm-based	international	community.	The	term	
‘Strategic	Partnership’,	due	 to	 its	political	character,	does	not	have	on	 the	EU	side	a	settled	established	
definition	and	it	differs	case	by	case.	However,	 it	 is	understood	that	 it	 implies	 the	engagement	with	third	
countries	in	terms	of	equality	in	order	to	jointly	address	and	have	close	collaboration	on	issues	of	common	
and	global	 interest,	maintaining	a	positive	and	permanent	dialogue	 in	all	dimensions	of	 foreign	policy,	
systematic	policy	coordination,	establishment	of	 joint	 initiatives,	et	cetera.	Moreover,	 such	 ‘Strategic	
Partnerships’	are	considered	by	the	EU	as	vital	elements	to	implement	its	foreign	and	security	policy	vision:	
preventing	conflict,	promoting	security	and	development	(Odgaard	&	Biscop,	2007,	pp.	54,	60).
	 Nevertheless,	and	in	spite	of	the	advances	in	terms	of	effectiveness	and	clarity	achieved	with	the	Lisbon	
Treaty	and	EEAS,	 the	EU’s	 foreign	policy	continues	 to	be	 formulated	 through	a	complex	sui generis	
mechanism	in	which	the	decision	power	is	 largely	at	 the	hands	of	the	Member	States	and	consensuses	are	
required.	Member	States	have	agreed	in	the	need	for	a	more	coherent	EU	foreign	policy,	and	in	the	need	to	
solve	the	punctual	difficulties	to	reach	common	agreements	on	crucial	policy	issues.2）	However,	 the	CFSP	
continues	 to	be	predominantly	an	 intergovernmental	policy	 instead	of	a	supranational	one,	 requiring	 the	
agreement	of	the	Member	States	to	determine	the	EU’s	stand	vis-à-vis	international	issues,	rather	than	this	
	   1）	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	states	(ACP).
	   2）	A	recent	illustrative	example	of	the	difficulty	to	reach	a	common	EU	voice	on	foreign	policy	issues	can	be	found	in	the	divergence	of	standpoints	
among	EU	Member	States	vis-à-vis	the	US-led	invasion	of	Iraq	in	2003.	While	Member	States	such	as	the	UK,	Italy	or	Spain	supported	the	
US-led	coalition,	Germany,	France	and	the	Nordic	countries	strongly	opposed	giving	support	to	any	intervention	without	the	UN	Security	
Council’s	mandate;	meaning	that	no	official	EU	position	was	reached.
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being	decided	within	 the	EU	institutions	properly.	Despite	 this,	 the	EU’s	foreign	policy	continues	 to	be	
motivated	by	a	 twofold	objective.	The	first,	of	an	 internal	EU	nature,	obeys	 to	 the	 logic	 that	effectively	
developing	 relations	with	State	and	non-State	actors	globally	contributes	 to	 the	consolidation	and	 the	
progressive	formation	of	an	EU	‘own’	standpoint	and	character	in	global	affairs.	The	second,	of	an	external	
nature,	is	a	response	to	the	rapidly	changing	global	balances	of	power,	progressively	less	Western-dominated,	
by	which	the	EU	sees	the	need	for	seeking	partners	and	engaging	actively	with	relevant	actors	across	the	
globe	in	order	to	consolidate	its	role	as	a	global	player.	
	 In	the	case	of	East-Asia,	the	EU’s	involvement	and	relevance	in	this	region’s	political	and	security	issues	
remains	relatively	weak	and	low-profile.	However,	this	being	a	region	identified	by	the	Union	as	a	priority	
given	its	unprecedented	rapid	changes,	the	emergence	of	China	as	a	major	regional	and	global	power	and	its	
economic	dynamism,	 the	EU	has	established	 ‘Strategic	Partnerships’	with	both	China	and	Japan.	The	
importance	of	these	two	countries	in	global	affairs	is	self-evident,	not	only	because	both	are	among	the	major	
economies	in	the	world,	but	also	due	to	their	presence	in	international	organizations,	fora,	and	multilateral	
institutions.	
	 Contrasting	with	the	EU’s	relations	with	other	strategic	partners	(most	notably	the	US	and	Canada),	 the	
political	and	security	relations	with	both	China	and	Japan	have	been	constantly	characterized	by	a	recurrent	
gap	between	the	discourse	or	rhetoric	level,	i.e.	the	objectives	envisioned	for	such	Strategic	Partnership;	and	
the	outcomes,	i.e.	the	actual	materialization	of	such	objectives	into	concrete	action	or	policy.	Besides	the	sui 
generis	character	of	the	EU’s	CFSP,	the	emergence	of	such	gaps	in	EU-China	and	EU-Japan	relations	needs	to	
be	assessed	considering	the	different	characteristics	of	each	of	these	partners,	the	complexity	of	intra	East-
Asian	relations,	identities,	perceptions	and	formation	of	preferences	and	interests,	as	crucial	determinants	for	
the	course	and	future	of	 the	Partnerships.	Moreover,	 the	peculiarities	of	 the	CFSP	call	 for	considering	
analyzing	the	EU’s	relations	with	these	two	countries	as	part	of	a	larger	network	of	inter-regional	relations	
rather	than	as	‘conventional’	bilateral	relations.	Considering	this,	the	subsequent	chapters	of	this	paper	will,	
first,	 review	the	historical	formation	and	current	state-of-affairs	of	 the	EU-China	and	EU-Japan	Strategic	
Partnerships,	and	secondly,	assess	the	role	that	perceptions,	objectives	and	expectations	as	well	as	structures	
play	in	offering	explanations	of	the	EU’s	low	profile	in	East	Asian	affairs.	
EU-CHINA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
	 The	EU	and	China	have	maintained	bilateral	relations	for	over	three	decades.	Following	the	common	pattern	
observable	in	the	EU’s	relations	with	third	States,	contacts	were	initiated	by	an	increased	interest	in	enhancing	
bilateral	trade	and	economic	ties,	while	political-and	security-related	aspects	were	excluded	from	any	bilateral	
dialogue.	In	the	context	of	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	the	EU	did	not	have	such	a	particularly	strong	interest	in	
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deepening	 its	 relations	with	China	as	 in	continuing	 to	develop	 its	 relations	with	Japan	or	other	Western	
partners.	Nevertheless,	with	the	progressively	increasing	importance	of	China	in	the	international	arena	after	
end	of	 the	Cold	War	coupled	with	a	growing	 interest	 in	multilateralism	 fruit	of	 the	new	context	 and	
‘multipolar	moment’	that	emerged	with	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	the	EU	helped	ease	out	Chinese	isolation	
and	initiated	the	move	towards	a	more	comprehensive,	deep	and	far-reaching	collaboration	with	China.	
	 The	first	decade	of	EU-China	relations	was	limited	to	commercial	and	economic	issues	under	the	framework	
of	 the	1978	and	1985	 trade	agreements.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Tiananmen	Square	protests	of	1989	 the	
relations	worsened	considerably,	 leading	 to	significant	political	stalemates	which	would	repeat	with	 the	
missile	tests	in	the	Taiwan	Strait	in	1995	and	1996.	In	such	context,	the	EU	sought	to	reinforce	and	emphasize	
the	diplomatic	dimension	of	its	ties	with	China,	outlined	in	the	EC’s	Communications	“A	long-term	policy	for	
China-Europe	relations”	of	1995	and	“Building	a	Comprehensive	Partnership	with	China”	in	1998.	These	
efforts	on	 the	EU	side	 led	 to	a	significant	development	of	 the	political	 relations	and	ultimately	meant	a	
functional	expansion	of	the	policy-areas	and	issues	covered	in	EU-China	relations,	from	merely	commercial	
and	business	issues	to	political	and	military	areas,	materializing	in	the	annual	Bilateral	Summit,	subsequent	
diplomatic	visits,	 the	Ministerial	Troika	meetings,3）	 the	Human	Rights	Dialogue	framework	as	well	as	 the	
establishment	of	sectorial	working	groups	and	dialogues	in	over	20	subject	areas.	After	 this	new	bilateral	
engagement,	the	punitive	measures	initially	adopted,	however,	soon	were	deemed	temporary	and	lifted,	with	
the	exception	of	the	arms	embargo	that	remains	in	place	to	date.	Yet,	despite	the	positive	impact	that	this	turn	
has	had	in	the	overall	course	of	EU-China	relations,	the	renewed	EU	diplomatic	assertiveness	has	not	been	
always	welcome	by	the	Chinese	side,	whose	official	line	has	considered	the	EU’s	approach	to	be,	 in	some	
occasions,	an	intromission	in	Chinese	internal	affairs	as	it	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	
	 Since	2003,	after	setting	up	an	agenda	for	pushing	forward	and	deepening	their	political	relations,	the	EU	and	
China	mutually	recognized	each-other	as	‘comprehensive	strategic	partners’.	From	the	EU	perspective,	the	
envisaged	objectives	for	the	Strategic	Partnership	with	China	are	defined	in	the	following	five	points:	
1.	 engaging	China	further	in	the	international	community	through	an	upgraded	political	dialogue;
2.	 	supporting	China’s	transition	to	an	open	society	based	upon	the	rule	of	law	and	respect	for	human	
rights	and	democracy;
3.	 	integrating	China	further	in	the	world	economy	by	bringing	it	more	fully	into	the	world	trading	system	
and	by	supporting	the	process	of	economic	and	social	reform	under	way	in	the	country;
4.	 making	better	use	of	existing	European	financial	resources;	and
	   3）	The	Troika	Meeting	is	generally	attended	on	the	EU	side	by	the	President	of	the	EU	General	Affairs	and	Foreign	Relations	Council	(Foreign	
Minister	of	the	Member	State	holding	the	rotating	Council	Presidency),	the	High	Representative	for	the	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy,	
and	European	Commissioner	for	External	Relations	and	European	Neighborhood	Policy;	and	by	the	Chinese	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs.
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5.	 raising	the	EU’s	profile	in	China	(European	Commission,	2003).
	 In	 its	updated	Communication	of	2003,	 the	European	Commission	focused	its	action	towards	China	in	
developing	‘shared	responsibilities	 in	promoting	global	governance’,	since,	according	to	the	Commission,	
China	could	play	a	fundamental	role	in	reconciling	the	interests	of	developing	and	developed	countries,	and	in	
promoting	peace	and	stability	in	Asia	(ibid.).
	 In	regard	to	the	strategic	dialogue,	the	EU	has	designated	as	well	as	series	of	ambitious	core	areas	in	which	
it	aims	to	develop	joint	action	with	China.	Such	issue	areas	are:
1.	 human	rights	concerns;
2.	 combating	illegal	immigration	and	trafficking	in	human	beings;
3.	 combating	organized	crime;
4.	 	regional	issues	(reconciliation	between	the	two	Koreas,	cooperation	with	regard	to	Burma,	negotiated	
solution	to	the	territorial	claims	in	the	South	China	Sea,	the	Taiwan	issue);
5.	 disarmament	and	limiting	arms	proliferation	and	exports;	and
6.	 promoting	multilateral	dialogue	on	security	(preventing	conflicts	at	regional	and	international	level).
	 While	this	gives	the	Strategic	Partnership	a	solid	basis	to	develop,	some	of	these	issues	are	far	beyond	the	
acting	capacity	of	the	EU	in	Asia	(case	of	Taiwan	and	the	Koreas),	and	beyond	the	interest	of	China	in	its	
foreign	action,	which	is	strongly	positioned	against	intervention	in	what	it	considers	other	countries’	internal	
affairs	(cases	of	Burma	and	the	Koreas).	
	 From	the	EU	perspective,	the	engagement	with	China	is	seen	positively,	and	the	country	is	not	perceived	as	
a	 threat	since	both	do	not	have	opposed	strategic	 interests	 (Scott,	2007,	p.	18).	However,	arguably,	 the	
relations	with	China	pose	for	the	EU	a	notable	dual	challenge.	On	the	one	hand,	given	its	geopolitical	and	
economic	 importance,	and	as	a	major	global	player,	particularly	 taking	 into	account	China’s	Permanent	
Membership	 at	 the	United	Nations	Security	Council	 (UNSC),	 a	 core	 institution	 for	 the	 effective	
multilateralism	and	rule-based	global	order	that	the	EU	aims	at	promoting,	China	is	not	only	one	more	among	
third-country	partners	for	the	EU,	but	one	with	whom	a	fully	functional	‘Strategic	Partnership’	is	conditio sine 
qua non	for	consolidating	the	EU’s	global	actor	role	as	well	as	for	the	achievement	of	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	
vision	of	effective	multilateralism	(Odgaard	&	Biscop,	2007,	p.	61).	On	the	other	hand,	among	the	Strategic	
Partners,	China	is	 the	one	that	most	directly	challenges	the	EU’s	norm-based	diplomacy	and	the	universal	
validity	of	European	values.	
	 Arguably,	 divergences	 along	 these	points	 and	 the	 fundamental	 difference	 in	values	give	place	 to	
misperceptions,	gaps	of	mutual	understanding,	and	 to	a	great	extent	become	obstacles	 for	moving	 the	
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Strategic	Partnership	towards	more	action-oriented	collaboration.	On	the	one	hand,	 this	problem	is	widely	
recognized	by	Chinese	academia,	who	in	numerous	occasions	have	determined	that	the	EU	should	“give	up	its	
ambition	to	‘teach	China’	how	to	behave,”4）	stop	aiming	at	imposing	European	political	values	and	system	to	
China,	and	that	the	EU	must	“stop	clinging	to	its	Eurocentric	concepts	on	ideological	and	political	issues	such	
as	human	rights,	humanitarianism	and	‘universal	values’”(Cui,	2010,	p.	397;	Ding,	2009).	On	the	other	hand,	
the	EU’s	diplomatic	mission	to	China	recognizes	 the	Chinese	advances	 in	areas	such	as	human	rights	or	
environmental	protection	although	it	perceives	that	such	advances	are	an	evidence	of	the	fact	that	China	is	
progressively	converging	towards	the	European	values.5）
	 From	 the	Chinese	perspective	as	well,	 the	Strategic	Partnership	with	 the	EU	 is	a	crucial	element	 to	
implement	 the	Chinese	ambition	of	multilateralism,	aimed	at	creating	a	peaceful,	stable	and	prosperous	
environment	 in	which	to	develop,	update	 its	capabilities,	reap	the	benefits	of	globalization	and	ultimately	
realize	its	potential	as	global	power	(Odgaard	&	Biscop,	2007,	p.	68;	Zhang,	2009).	For	China,	the	EU	is	seen	
as	an	attractive	alternative	 to	 the	US,	and	as	a	valuable	partner	with	whom	to	counterbalance	American	
hegemony	(Zhou,	2009).	Moreover,	as	China	remains	a	developing	country,	the	Strategic	Partnership	with	the	
EU	is	seen	as	a	priority	option	in	the	fields	of	scientific	and	technological	collaboration,	as	well	as	to	learn	
models	of	regional	development	and	convergence.	
	 In	terms	of	security	and	political	relations,	the	Chinese	‘EU	Policy	Paper’	of	2003	discloses,	at	least	in	terms	
of	rhetoric,	that	China	regards	a	high	potential	in	the	bilateral	collaboration:
The	common	ground	between	China	and	the	EU	far	outweighs	their	disagreements.	Both	China	and	the	
EU	stand	for	democracy	in	international	relations	and	an	enhanced	role	of	the	UN.	Both	are	committed	to	
combating	international	terrorism	and	promoting	sustainable	development	through	poverty	elimination	
and	environmental	protection	endeavors	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	
2003).	
	 Developing	the	Strategic	Partnership	with	the	EU,	moreover,	is	seen	by	China	as	an	opportunity	to	convey	
the	image	of	being	a	peaceful	‘civilian	power’	as	the	EU,	advocating	for	dialogue,	consultation	and	rule-based	
mechanisms	for	conflict	 resolution	rather	 than	making	use	of	power	politics.	Nevertheless,	 the	Chinese	
commitment	to	multilateralism,	preeminent	role	of	the	UN	and	non-intervention	is	more	determined	by	its	
historical	and	current	context	as	an	international	actor	than	its	official	rhetoric	conveys	(Li,	2007,	pp.	48-52).	
Historically,	China	has	come	a	long	way	in	order	to	be	gradually	accepted	as	a	responsible	global	player,	and	
	   4）	The	prevalence	of	such	vision,	which	 is	widely	 represented	 in	Chinese	 literature	 regarding	EU-China	relations	was	corroborated	and	
acknowledged	to	the	author	in	an	interview	at	the	Department	of	European	Studies	of	the	Chinese	Academy	of	Social	Sciences	in	Beijing	in	
March	2012.
	   5）	As	acknowledged	by	a	High-Level	EU	official	at	the	European	Commission’s	Delegation	to	China,	in	an	interview	in	March	2012.
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this	is	an	image	it	aims	at	maintaining	and	improving.	Moreover,	China	does	not	count	today	on	the	necessary	
technology	and	military	capabilities	to	present	effective	opposition	to	the	US	preeminent	position	in	(East)	
Asia,	consequently	opposing	hegemonic	stands.	
	 According	to	this	vision	as	a	valuable	partner	in	multilateralism,	China	has	long	supported	the	process	of	
European	integration	and	development	of	the	EU’s	personality	as	a	global	actor	(Zhang,	2009).	China	aims	at	
the	EU	to	develop	a	genuinely	European	foreign	and	common	security	policy	that	is	largely	independent	from	
the	transatlantic	relations	and	from	the	US.	This	fact	has	revealed	itself	most	clearly	during	the	episode	in	
2004-05	of	the	proposal	to	lift	the	EU	arms	embargo	imposed	on	China	as	a	result	of	the	Tiananmen	Square	
events	of	1989	in	exchange	for	recognized	advancements	by	China	in	matter	of	human	rights.6）	Despite	that	
no	internal	EU	consensus	was	reached	on	the	matter,	with	the	UK	and	France	as	major	Member	States	in	
favor	of	lifting	the	ban	and	Germany	among	others,	opposing	it;	it	was	the	suspicions	and	disapproval	arisen	
in	Washington	and	Tokyo	what	ultimately	motivated	the	continuation	of	the	ban,	and	gave	place	to	a	certain	
Chinese	disenchantment	with	the	EU,	which	was	perceived	as	unable	to	maintain	an	independent	stand	from	
the	US	 interests,	 or	 to	 effectively	 reach	 a	 consensus	 among	 its	Member	States	within	 the	 complex	
intergovernmental	 system	of	decision-making	 in	 the	EU’s	CFSP	 (Liu,	2007,	p.	121),	what	China	has	
categorized	as	‘the	flaws’	of	the	EU	as	a	foreign	policy	actor	(Ding,	2009).	
	 Since	the	establishment	of	the	EU-China	Strategic	Partnership	in	2003,	however,	progress	has	certainly	been	
made.	The	Strategic	Dialogue	framework	has	given	place	to	some	concrete	results,	such	as	the	2004	Joint	
Declaration	on	Non-Proliferation	and	Arms	Control,	and	also	upon	the	basis	of	the	existing	dialogue,	joint	
anti-piracy	actions	 in	Somali	waters	are	being	carried	out	successfully	under	 the	framework	 laid	by	 the	
growing	common	interest	 in	enhancing	cooperation	 in	maritime	security	 issues	 (Larik	&	Weiler,	2011).	
Nevertheless,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	value	of	the	Strategic	Partnership	continues	to	be	mainly	expressed	in	
paper	rather	 than	in	concrete	action.	A	turn	towards	pragmatism	on	the	basis	of	 the	dialogues	and	policy	
adjustments	must	be	undertaken	in	order	to	be	able	to	call	this	bilateral	relation	a	true	Strategic	Partnership.	At	
the	same	time,	 the	fundamental	differences	between	China	and	the	EU	remain	in	place.	Besides	the	most	
problematic	and	obvious	differences	in	regard	to	human	rights	and	democracy,	not	only	in	the	international	
arena	but	also	in	their	application	to	China	properly;	fundamental	differences	still	exist	in	the	way	that	both	
the	EU	and	China	perceive	the	multilateralism,	the	preeminence	of	the	UN	System,	and	the	rule	of	law.	In	
other	words,	 the	Chinese	conceptualization	of	 these	does	not	 accept	 the	universality	of	 freedom	and	
democracy	values	(as	understood	by	the	EU	and	the	West)	as	the	moral	core	of	the	UN	System	to	rule	the	
conduct	of	States	(Li,	2007).	To	a	certain	extent,	the	Chinese	strong	bid	for	multilateralism	and	sovereignty	
does	not	only	obey	to	its	conception	of	international	affairs,	but	also	to	its	history	as	a	global	actor	and	its	
	   6）	Including	the	ratification	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	of	1976.
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current	limitations	and	domestic	challenges.	This	fact	reveals	itself	very	clearly	in	the	Chinese	disregard	of	
conditionality	policies	towards	authoritarian	regimes	in	Africa	and	Asia	in	the	name	of	non-intervention	and	
absolute	respect	for	sovereignty.
	 Conclusively,	the	EU	and	China	have	successfully	initiated	the	consolidation	of	their	Strategic	Partnership,	
which	is	manifested	primarily	in	a	well-developed	and	extensive	framework	of	political	dialogues	in	over	20	
issue	areas.	Some	more	discreet	advances	have	been	made	in	terms	of	policy	materialization	or	joint	action,	
although	the	need	for	a	pragmatic	turn	is	recognized	in	both	sides	(Chen,	2010;	Zhang,	2009).	Nevertheless,	
considering	that	China	and	the	EU	do	not	have	any	directly	opposed	strategic	interest,	and	that	both	have	
mutually	recognized	the	other	as	a	key	partner	for	the	consolidation	of	their	role	as	global	players,	further	
advancements	in	EU-China	bilateral	relations	are	expected	to	come.	
EU-JAPAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
	 The	formalization	of	EU-Japanese	relations	takes	place	with	the	1991	Hague	Declaration,	despite	bilateral	
contacts,	meetings	and	ad-hoc	agreements	had	been	taking	place	before.	As	well	as	with	the	case	of	China,	
EU-Japan	relations	during	the	Cold	War	had	been	dominated	by	economic	and	trade	issues,	mainly	disputes,	
and	responded	to	what	scholar	Paul	J.	Cardwell	described	as	a	 time	when	“[in	Japan]	 those	who	did	pay	
attention	 to	 the	EU	did	not	see	 it	as	a	preventative	measure	against	 further	war	or	reinforcement	against	
communism,	but	as	a	means	by	which	European	countries	could	exclude	Japanese	imports”	(Cardwell,	2004,	
p.	12).	Moreover,	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	stimulated	in	Japan	the	pursuit	of	an	alternative	focus	to	its	security	
and	foreign	policies,	complementary	to	its	interests	within	the	US-Japan	security	alliance,	but	not	substitutive	
of	it	(Mykal,	2009,	pp.	2-4).	This	alternative	focus	was	intended	to	allow	Japan	to	reflect	its	compromise	with	
security	 in	a	broad	sense,	at	 the	same	time	that	 it	would	allow	the	country	 to	maintain	 its	Constitutional	
antimilitarism	and	to	continue	benefiting	from	the	protection	granted	by	the	US.	Also	in	Europe,	the	limited	
political	dimension	of	 the	EEC	at	 the	 time,	 its	primarily	economic	character	and	the	 lack	of	foreign	and	
security	capacities	laid	the	conditions	in	which	Japan	was	being	seen	as	too	distant	to	engage	in	cooperation.	
Moreover,	the	low	profile	that	Japan	had	been	maintaining	since	the	end	of	World	War	II	on	its	international	
relations	did	not	contribute	to	reversing	this	situation.	
	 Since	their	formalization	in	1991,	the	Japan-EU	partnership	has	been	outlined	in	two	policy	documents:	from	
1991	to	2001	with	the	Hague	Declaration,	and	from	2001	until	 today	with	the	so-called	Action	Plan.	In	a	
context	of	euphoria	propitiated	by	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War,	Europe	and	Japan	recognized	each	other	as	
‘natural’	and	‘strategic’	partners	and	stated	 their	 renewed	 interest	and	ambition	for	pushing	cooperation	
forward	and	expanding	it	 into	political	and	security	issues	(Berkofsky,	2007;	Reiterer,	2006).	Arguably,	the	
Hague	Declaration	of	1991	can	be	merely	seen	as	a	framework	document	acknowledging	the	ambitions	for	the	
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further	development	of	 the	 cooperation	between	 the	ECC,	 its	Member	States	 and	 Japan,	 as	well	 as	
institutionalizing	a	series	of	meetings	which	had	been	taking	place	before	in	an	ad-hoc	manner.7）	Besides	that,	
some	of	the	provisions	of	the	Joint	Declaration	set	the	path	for	what	has	developed	into	the	existing	security	
dialogue	and	cooperation	between	Japan	and	the	EU.8）	Nevertheless,	the	Hague	Declaration	did	not	attract	the	
interest	of	neither	the	media	nor	of	the	academic	community,	and	it	became	soon	the	object	of	criticism	by	its	
excess	of	grandiloquence	and	poor	concretion	(Berkofsky,	2007,	p.	10).	
	 Despite	this,	perhaps	the	most	valuable	aspect	the	Joint	Declaration	of	1991	is	its	reference	in	its	preamble	
to	the	shared	values	and	aspirations9）	of	the	EEC	and	Japan,	as	the	motivation	for	deepening	their	cooperation	
and	developing	a	comprehensive	partnership,	a	motive	 that	has	been	 invoked	repeatedly	 in	 the	rhetoric	
surrounding	EU-Japan	relations	(Cardwell,	2004;	Hook,	2000).	
	 In	2001,	Japan	and	the	EU	adopted	an	Action	Plan	named	“Shaping	our	Common	Future,”	updating	the	Joint	
Declaration	of	1991.	The	Action	Plan	envisioned	a	‘New	Decade	of	EU-	Japan	relations’,	and	listed	potential	
new	actions	and	areas	of	cooperation	in	more	than	a	100	points,	divided	into	four	topical	areas:	1)	promotion	
of	peace	and	security,	2)	strengthening	trade	and	economic	partnership,	3)	coping	with	the	new	global	and	
social	challenges,	and	4)	bringing	together	their	people	and	cultures	(EU	-	Japan	Summit,	2001).	
	 However,	also	in	the	case	of	the	Action	Plan,	critical	voices	appeared	rapidly	pointing	out	the	‘shopping	list’	
format	 of	 the	declaration,	 as	 described	by	Berkofsky	 (2007,	 p.	 10),	 and	once	 again,	 the	 excess	 of	
grandiloquent	rhetoric10）	and	overly	ambitious	objectives	in	contrast	to	scarce	mentioning	of	how	to	achieve	
the	outlined	cooperation	objectives	(Hook,	Gilson	et	al.,	2005,	p.	295).	While	not	denying	the	truth	of	such	
claims,	 the	Action	Plan	supposed	a	step	forward	from	the	modest	results	of	 the	1991	Joint	Declaration	in	
defining	in	a	narrower	sense	the	issues	and	areas	in	which	cooperation	was	possible	or	desired,	despite	the	
excessive	extension	of	the	list,	such	as	the	promotion	of	Human	Security	and	human	rights,	development,	
environmental	protection,	among	others	 (Cardwell,	2004;	Hook,	Gilson	et	al.,	2011),	 issues	 identified	
primarily	along	the	shared	identities	and	capacities	as	Civilian	Powers	(Mayer,	2008;	Mykal,	2009).	
	 Security	cooperation	has	been	 the	 least	developed	dimension	of	 the	Partnership,	having	mostly	been	
articulated	along	the	Civilian	Power	identities	and	capacities,	focusing	primarily	on	non-traditional	aspects	of	
security	and	channeling	primarily	through	multilateral	fora	given	the	preference	for	informal	settings	and	lack	
	   7）	One	annual	Summit,	an	annual	meeting	between	the	Commission	and	the	Japanese	government	at	ministerial	 level,	and	a	 twice-a-year	
consultation	between	the	Foreign	Ministers	of	the	EU	and	the	Member	of	the	Commission	for	External	Relations	plus	the	Japanese	Foreign	
Minister	(Troika	meeting)
	   8）	Covering	issues	such	as	supporting	the	strengthening	of	the	UN	role	or	the	joint	support	to	Cambodia	its	efforts	to	resolve	the	issues	related	to	
small	arms	in	the	country.
	   9）	These	values	are	the	common	attachment	to	freedom,	democracy,	the	rule	of	law	and	human	rights;	common	attachment	to	market	principles,	
free	trade	and	development	of	a	prosperous	world	economy;	acknowledgement	of	the	increasing	close	ties	in	a	context	of	growing	worldwide	
interdependence;	need	for	more	international	cooperation;	common	ambitions	for	security,	peace	and	stability	in	the	word;	acknowledgment	of	
the	importance	of	strengthening	their	dialogue	in	order	to	make	a	joint	contribution	towards	safeguarding	peace	in	the	world,	setting	a	stable	
international	order	according	to	the	principles	and	purposes	of	the	UN	Charter	and	taking	up	the	challenges	that	the	international	community	
is	facing;	among	others.
	  10）	As	an	example	of	such	rhetoric,	the	Action	Plan	was	envisioned	as	a	“millennium	partnership	between	Brussels	and	Tokyo.”
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of	 institutionalized	mechanisms	in	 this	partnership.	It	has	been	suggested	that	 this	has	contributed	to	 the	
development	of	a	comprehensive	security	dialogue	which	however	 lacks	visibility	(Mykal,	2009).	This	 is	
understandable	considering	the	limited	security	personality	of	the	EU,	as	it	is	with	the	case	of	the	EU-China	
Partnership	(Hill,	1993;	Smith,	2005),	 the	Constitutional	 limitations	of	Japanese	defense	policy,	and	 its	
strategic	reliance	on	US-Japan	Security	Treaty11）	for	its	national	defense.	Diverse	authors	have	argued	that	this	
trend	is	bound	to	change	in	the	coming	years	as	both	parties’	security	relevance	is	set	to	increase	further:	in	
Europe,	the	ratification	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	alongside	with	the	expansion	of	NATO,	has	set	the	basis	for	a	
stronger	and	more	coherent	foreign	and	security	policy;	while	in	Japan,	the	debate	on	the	normalization	of	the	
country’s	military	and	security	capabilities	continues	to	be	a	hot	topic	in	the	agenda	with	increasing	popular	
support	notwithstanding	the	continued	support	 to	 the	pacifist	clauses	in	 the	Constitution	(Inoguchi,	2005;	
Lopez	Vidal,	2006;	Oros,	2008).	Thus,	security	cooperation	between	the	EU	and	Japan	has	maintained	a	low	
profile,	and	it	has	rarely	if	ever	become	headline	material.	Nevertheless,	as	suggested	by	Mykal,	besides	cases	
of	cooperation	within	multilateral	fora	together	with	successful	examples	of	cooperation	in	post-conflict	areas,	
it	is	the	security	dialogue	what	remains	the	most	important	dimension	of	EU-Japan	security	relations.	
	 The	most	notable	examples	of	EU-Japanese	cooperation	have	been,	to	name	a	few,	the	collaboration	within	
the	North	Korean	Energy	program	KEDO,12）	alongside	with	South	Korea,	the	US	and	Australia,	a	program	
envisioned	to	give	the	North	Korean	regime	the	possibility	to	demonstrate	its	goodwill	by	taking	part	in	an	
international	cooperation	project,13）	which	at	the	same	time	granted	Pyongyang	the	exceptional	possibility	to	
alleviate	the	negative	effects	of	its	energy	shortage	thanks	to	the	reactor	in	construction.14）	The	shared	broad	
conception	of	security	has	also	given	place	 to	 the	acknowledgement	of	compatible	 interests	 that	bridge	
economic,	developmental	and	security	policies,	as	 illustrated	by	the	convergence	of	 interests	between	the	
EU’s	neighborhood	Policy	and	Japan’s	Arch	of	Freedom	and	Prosperity,	having	both	a	comparable	geographic	
coverage	and	 the	aim	of	consolidating	democracy	and	promoting	economic	growth	as	well	as	greater	
integration	 in	 the	 international	community	of	former	Soviet	Republics	 in	 the	Caucasus	and	Central	Asia	
(MoFA	of	Japan,	2006).	Moreover,	Japan	and	the	EU	undertook	complementary	actions	towards	promoting	
Chinese	and	Russian	memberships	 to	 the	WTO	(Hook,	et	al.,	2005,	p.	197),	given	that	 the	 integration	in	
multilateral	 institutions	of	these	two	countries,	and	especially	of	their	shared	neighbor	Russia,	 is	a	crucial	
	  11）	Treaty	of	Mutual	Cooperation	and	Security	between	the	United	States	and	Japan.
	  12）	The	KEDO	framework	was	established	in	1995	with	the	objective	of	constructing	a	light-water	reactor	(LWR)	in	North	Korean	territory	with	
the	construction	team	and	the	security	control	being	provided	by	the	international	community,	as	well	as	the	technology	and	the	supervision	
technicians.
	  13）	KEDO	supposed	also	an	opportunity	 to	 increase	 international	 trust	 towards	 the	regime,	given	that	 the	construction	of	 the	reactor	under	
international	supervision	eliminated	 the	concerns	rising	from	the	development	of	 the	North	Korean	nuclear	program	and	 the	country’s	
ambitions	for	nuclear	weapons.
	  14）	The	KEDO	program	was	cancelled	in	2007	due	to	Pyongyang’s	unwillingness	 to	collaborate.	At	 the	 time,	KEDO	was	maintained	as	an	
informative	platform,	while	the	debate	on	nuclear-related	issues	(both	energetic	and	military)	shifted	to	the	Six-Party	Talks,	also	stranded	later,	
but	of	which	the	EU	was	not	a	member	Hook,	G.	D.,	Gilson,	J.,	et	al.	(2005).	Japan’s International Relations	(2nd	ed.).	London:	Routledge,	
KEDO.	(2007).	About	Us:	Our	History.			Retrieved	16	January,	2012,	from	http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp.
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issue	for	both	parties.
	 The	security	dialogue	between	the	EU	and	Japan	since	the	Joint	Declaration	of	1991	has	also	given	place	in	
multiple	occasions	to	manifested	mutual	support,	either	towards	concrete	action	on	the	ground	in	post-conflict	
zones,	especially	 in	Kosovo	and	Bosnia-Herzegovina;	or	 towards	offering	mutual	 support	 to	political	
initiatives	and	proposals	within	multilateral	 for	a	 such	as	 the	manifestation	of	mutual	 support	 for	 the	
establishment	of	a	Palestinian	State	as	a	roadmap	for	peace	in	the	Arab-Israeli	conflict,	in	East	Timor	and	in	
Africa	(Mykal,	2009,	pp.	8-22).15）	The	close	collaboration	in	the	Western	Balkans	constituted	one	of	the	basic	
pillars	in	the	consolidation	and	further	development	of	the	bilateral	security	cooperation.	
	 Put	briefly,	two	of	the	most	crucial	issues	that	shape	EU-Japan	security	relations	are	deeply	rooted	in	their	
compromise	for	human	security,	and	are,	 firstly,	 the	shared	compromise	with	peace-keeping	and	peace-
building	operations,	which	have	materialized	in	common	support	for	NGOs,	organization	of	symposia,	etc.,	
and	secondly,	post-conflict	nation-building,	which	have	given	place	 to	cooperation	both	 in	Africa	and	in	
Afghanistan	(Hook,	et	al.,	2005,	p.	334).	Besides,	Japan	and	the	EU	have	developed	closer	cooperation	in	
promoting	measures	to	tackle	broader	aspects	of	security,	such	as	measures	to	palliate	the	negative	effects	of	
climate	change.16）
	 In	 summary:	 notwithstanding	 the	multiple	 limitations	 and	difficulties	 in	 terms	of	 visibility	 and	
materialization	of	Japanese-EU	cooperation,	it	can	nevertheless	be	argued	that	the	dimension	of	security	is	the	
aspect	of	EU-Japan	relations	that	has	experienced	a	greater	change	in	the	last	decade,	and	that	it	has	become	
an	aspect	which	has	progressively	been	given	more	attention	in	the	bilateral	relations.	The	completion	in	2011	
of	the	decade	of	foreseen	validity	for	the	2001	Action	Plan	has	opened	the	debate	on	the	future	of	the	strategic	
partnership	at	the	time	of	the	renewal	of	the	basic	partnership	guidelines.	Amidst	this	debate,	both	EU	and	
Japanese	policymakers	have	pointed	out	the	need	to	give	the	partnership	a	pragmatic	turn,	in	order	the	actual	
dynamics	into	a	more	solid	and	agile	cooperation,17）	a	fact	that	confirms	that	policymakers	acknowledge	the	
criticism	received	from	the	academic	community	during	the	previous	two	decades.	In	this	regard,	the	2011	
Bilateral	Summit	already	identified	the	need	for	pragmatism	in	order	to	“take	the	partnership	to	a	higher	level	
and	to	strengthen	cooperation	in	order	to	better	face	common	challenges,”	and	identified	the	following	four	
points	as	the	most	important	axes	for	the	next	decade	of	cooperation,	with	two	of	the	main	issues	at	stake	
	  15）	During	the	1990s,	Japan’s	peace	consolidation	policies	played	an	important	role	in	the	Western	Balkans.	Moreover,	beside	the	governments,	
Japanese	and	European	NGOs	maintained	close	cooperation	 in	 the	region,	providing	support	 to	development,	as	well	as	 technical	and	
financial	support.	Scholars	have	argued	that	Japan’s	strategy	with	its	participation	in	the	Western	Balkans	responded	to	the	will	of	promoting	
its	own	conception	of	security	and	at	 the	same	time,	consolidating	the	country’s	 image	as	a	reliable	partner	 in	Europe.	It	 is	 through	this	
participation,	thus,	that	Japan	obtained	the	condition	of	observer	in	the	Council	of	Europe	and	became	a	member	of	the	KEDO	framework	
through	the	EU’s	invitation
	  16）	High-level	meetings	regarding	environmental	issues	take	place	at	a	yearly	basis,	and	since	the	2007	EU-Japan	Summit,	both	parties	have	taken	
the	compromise	to	continue	holding	environment-related	consultations	at	a	regular	basis,	ad-hoc	meetings	if	required,	as	well	as	to	intensify	
cooperation	in	order	to	establish	an	effective	post-2012	framework	against	climate	change	Japan-EU	Summit.	(2007).	Implementation	of	the	
EU-Japan	Action	Plan.	Retrieved	from	http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/japan/sum06_07/2007_annex_action_plan.pdf
	  17）	In	this	sense,	the	new	Partnership	guidelines	shall	not	aim	at	being	as	overreaching	as	the	current	Action	Plan,	but	at	formulating	more	concrete	
goals	with	greater	possibilities	of	materializing	in	concrete	joint	action.
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directly	in	relation	with	security	(in	its	broad	conception),	and	the	need	for	mutual	engagement	in	key	security	
concerns	such	as	the	North	Korean	or	Iranian	threats	is	openly	recognized.
• 	[Defining	the]	next	steps	for	the	further	strengthening	of	EU-Japan	political	and	economic	relations;
• 	In	light	of	the	experience	of	the	accident	at	Fukushima	Daiichi	nuclear	power	plant,	working	together	to	
promote	nuclear	safety	around	the	world18）;
• 	Other	major	global	challenges,	 including	economy,	finance	and	trade	issues,	climate	change	and	the	
environment	and	energy	security;	and
• 	Key	regional	and	international	issues,	including	the	latest	situation	in	North	Africa/Middle	East,	North	
Korea	and	Iran	(European	Commission,	2011).
GAPS AND CHALLENGES FOR ANALYSIS: RHETORIC AND STRUCTURE
(1) PERCEPTION GAPS
	 As	mentioned	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	paper,	the	EU’s	involvement	in	East	Asian	political	and	security	
issues	has	remained	low-profile	in	the	two	decades	since	the	formalization	of	cooperation,	and	the	Strategic	
Partnerships	with	both	China	and	Japan	have	been	characterized	by	recurrent	gaps	between	the	rhetoric	and	
the	joint-action	or	policy	materialization	levels,	that	have	been	recognized	widely	in	the	existing	literature.	
	 The	causes	that	explain	the	existence	of	such	gaps	are	complex	and	mutually	interdependent	in	the	majority	
of	cases.	Therefore,	in	order	to	have	a	clearer	understanding,	the	author	proposes	a	tri-dimensional	framework	
of	analysis,	taking	into	account	1)	the	perceptions	level,	i.e.	the	perceptions	that	the	EU	generates	in	China	
and	Japan	and	vice-versa,	and	how	these	actors	mutually	identify	each-other	as	potential	cooperation	partners;	
2)	the	outcomes	level,	i.e.	what	is	actually	achieved	within	the	framework	of	the	Strategic	Partnerships;	and	3)	
the	structural	level,	i.e.	the	institutional/bureaucratic	conditioning	aspects	within	which	the	relations	develop	
(see	table	1).	
	 On	the	perceptions	 level	 is	arguably	where	most	notable	differences	exist.	From	the	 literature	review,	
coupled	with	impressions	collected	through	interviews	with	officials,	and	focusing	first	on	the	EU-China	
Strategic	Partnership,	 the	EU	official	position	identifies	China	as	an	influential	and	non-threatening	global	
power,	with	whom	cooperation	is	actively	sought	as	a	core	point	towards	supporting	European	ambitions	for	
effective	multilateralism,	particularly	considering	 the	country’s	condition	as	Permanent	Member	of	 the	
UNSC.	Moreover,	the	EU	identifies	many	shared	interests	with	China,	particularly	along	the	terms	of	global	
	  18）	Thus,	despite	the	major	shock	that	the	March	11	earthquake	supposed,	and	the	centrality	it	took	during	the	Summit,	it	becomes	evident	that	there	
is	a	 tendency	towards	defining	more	immediately	achievable	objectives,	which	are	of	great	 importance	for	both	parties,	and	along	which	
cooperation	can	be	less	problematic	compared	to	other	issues	where	common	interest	is	less	clear.
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stability,	multilateralism	and	shared	responsibility.	Nevertheless,	 the	European	perceptions	regarding	China	
not	 being	 a	democracy,	 its	 deficient	Human	Rights	 record	 and	 the	very	own	meaning	of	 ‘effective	
multilateralism’	differ	from	the	Chinese	ones	even	at	a	basic	level.	In	this	regard,	the	EU’s	official	standpoint	
is	that	the	EU’s	objectives	should	continue	to	be	the	moving	of	China	towards	the	European	or	Western	values	
of	democracy,	which	are	observed	as	being	universally	valid	and	desirable.	In	a	recent	interview	with	high	
Table 1 : Variables in explaining gaps in EU-China and EU-Japan relations.
EU-CHINA EU-JAPAN
Perception	
(from	EU)
• 	China	is	seen	as	a	major	power	/	very	influential	
partner
• 	China	a	peaceful	partner
• 	A	key	partner	to	fulfill	the	EU’s	multilateralism	
aspirations	(e.g.		PRC	is	a	permanent	m.	at	the	
UNSC)
• 	Acknowledgement	of	many	shared	interests
• 	China	deficient	in	democracy/human	rights:	
should	converge	towards	European	values
• 	Integrate	China	as	a	responsible	partner	globally
• 	Radically	different	values?
• 	Dependence	from	China?	(EU/Eurozone	crisis)
• 	Japan	as	a	like-minded	partner.
• 	Value-based	cooperation:	civilian	powers,	
promotion	democracy,	peace,	Human	Rights.
• 	Common	goals	identified,	but	different	
approach?
• 	Focus	on	US/Asia	(relative	indifference	to	
Europe)
• 	Constrains	prevent	diversification	of	its	foreign	
policy
• 	Lack	of	understanding	of	the	EU	policy-making	
and	structure
• 	Preference	for	bilateral	relations	with	EU	
Member	States
Perception
	(from	CN/JP)
• 	The	EU	is	a	valuable	partner	for	China’s	
ambitions	of	counterbalancing	the	US	position	
in	Asia	and	multilateralism	globally
• 	Myriad	common	objectives	identified
• 	China	has	supported	strongly	the	European	
integration	process	(interest	in	EU	becoming	a	
balancing	independent	player)
• 	EU	complex	entity	/	many	issues	preferred	to	
address	bilaterally	with	Member	States
• 	Perception	that	the	EU’s	policy	of	value-
diplomacy	is	counterproductive.	EU	as	
‘imposing’	its	values	on	China.
• 	Alike	and	compatible	values,	capabilities	and	
interests,	but	with	certain	clashes:	EU	
excessively	focused	on	norm-exporting	/	
moralistic	policy
• 	Most	efforts	vested	in	China	partnership.	Certain	
clashes	with	Japan’s	strategy	of	hedging	China.
• 	Certain	difficulty	in	Partnerships	among	equals	
(without	conditionality)
• 	Lack	of	a	clear	Asia	strategy	/	the	partnership	
with	China	arises	misunderstandings	(US	plays	a	
role)	
Cooperation	outcomes • 	A	comprehensive	network	of	bilateral	dialogue	
on	myriad	issues:	including	Human	Rights	and	
climate
• 	Problems	have	also	occurs	within	multilateral	
fora
• 	Very	limited	joint	policy	(notable	exception	Joint	
Anti-Piracy	operations	in	Somali	waters)
• 	Periodical	meetings	/	Summits
• 	Rhetoric	still	dominates.	The	question	on	how	to	
enhance	cooperation	continues	to	dominate	the	
agenda	after	2	decades	
• 	Some	cooperation	materialized	within	
multilateral	fora
• 	No	joint	policy	implemented
Structural	milieu	
(Both	Strategic	Partner-
ships	managed	in	isola-
tion)
• 	EU	deals	with	China	without	a	broader/higher	
Asia	Strategy.	No-coordination	between	EU	
Delegations	in	China	and	in	Japan
• 	China	has	a	strong	presence	in	Europe	and	vis-à-
vis	EU	institutions	(mainly	economic	and	
trade-related	but	with	political	influence.
• 	In	China,	EU	issues	are	dealt	at	State	Councilor	
level	(higher	than	FA	Minister).
• 	EU	Delegation	in	China	acts	as	embassy,	and	
deals	with	the	relations	in	coordination	with	the	
EEAS	in	Brussels.	
• 	China	has	a	mission	in	Brussels	since	1988.
• 	Certain	issues	better	dealt	bilaterally	with	
Member	States.
• 	No	Asia-Strategy.
• 	Japan	has	a	more	limited	presence	in	Europe	than	
China.	
• 	Japanese	mission	to	the	EU	/	EU	Delegation	to	
Japan
• 	Periodical	Summits	and	political	meetings	held	
at	high	level,	but	limited	technical/bureaucratic	
resources	allocated	in	Brussels	
• 	Remarkable	and	acknowledged	bureaucratic	
difficulties	that	prevent	smoother	cooperation
• 	Bilateral	relations	Member	States-Japan	are	
more	developed	and	general	preference	for	
these.	
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level	officials	of	the	European	Commission	Delegation	to	China	in	Beijing,	the	EU	perception	that	“China	is	
progressively	moving	towards	the	European	values	despite	a	long	road	is	still	ahead”	was	expressed	to	the	
author.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Chinese	official	rhetoric	towards	the	EU	grants	the	Union	a	superpower	status	
and	defines	it	as	an	influential	global	power.	The	EU	is	envisioned	as	a	key	partner	for	China’s	ambitions	to	
counterbalance	the	US	preeminent	position	in	Asia	and	globally,	as	well	as	for	building	steps	towards	the	
Chinese	ambitions	for	effective	multilateralism.	Similarly	as	the	EU	does,	Chinese	official	speech	identifies	
the	multiple	common	objectives	shared	with	the	EU,	although	a	common	understanding	of	more	sensitive	
issues	such	as	human	rights,	democracy	and	the	universality	of	Western	values	is	 less	clear	(Tian,	2009).	
Chinese	academic	writings	as	well	as	official	rhetoric	regard	the	EU’s	value	diplomacy	as	an	interference	with	
Chinese	domestic	affairs	and	have	repeatedly	asked	for	the	EU	to	‘stop	lecturing	China	how	to	behave’	or	to	
‘impose	European	political	values	and	system	into	China’,	arguing	that	 if	 the	EU	considers	 the	Strategic	
Partnership	with	China	a	framework	for	collaboration	among	equals,	the	EU	should	avoid	identifying	itself	as	
a	bearer	of	higher	moral	values.	Besides	 that,	 the	EU	is	perceived	on	the	Chinese	side	as	a	complex	and	
bureaucratized	actor,	with	whom	cooperation	requires	a	process	of	learning	and	socialization.	Despite	this	
complexity,	the	EU	is	perceived	by	the	Chinese	as	having	an	added-value	parallel	to	the	relations	with	the	
Member	States	although	the	bilateral	relations	between	these	and	China	continue	to	be	considered	of	great	
importance.	
	 When	looking	at	 the	EU-Japan	Strategic	Partnership,	 the	mutual	understanding	at	 the	perception	 level	
appears	to	be	less	problematic	as	in	the	case	of	China.	As	the	rhetoric	of	EU-Japan	relations	has	remarked	
since	 its	 formalization	 in	 the	early	1990s,	 the	EU	and	Japan	regard	 themselves	officially	as	 like-minded	
partners,	with	shared	values	and	objectives.	Before	European	eyes,	Japan	is	perceived	as	a	liberal	democracy,	
a	Civilian	Power	like	the	EU,	and	a	country	committed	to	the	promotion	of	peace,	development	and	human	
security	both	in	Asia	and	globally.	At	the	same	time,	Japan	is	perceived	as	having	‘compatible’	bureaucratic	
and	political	structures	with	the	EU,	despite	coordination	of	efforts	is	not	always	possible	due	to	excessive	
formal	requirements.19）	Nevertheless,	the	perception	of	such	common	values	is	tainted	by	the	fact	that	the	EU	
perceives	Japan	as	considering	Europe/the	EU	a	second-level	priority,	since	 the	country	 is	perceived	as	
directing	its	focus	overly	to	Asia	and	the	US-Japan	Security	Alliance.	In	this	same	line,	the	EU	perception	of	
Japan’s	foreign	policy	has	been	at	times	deemed	as	‘overly	dependent’	from	the	US-Alliance	and	accused	of	
having	little	room	for	diversification	(i.e.	Japan	having	constraints	to	diversify	its	foreign	policy)	(Tsuruoka,	
2008).	On	the	other	side,	Japanese	perceptions	of	the	EU	as	a	Strategic	Partner	are	also	dominated	by	the	
recognition	of	common	values	and	shared	interests	under	their	Civilian	Power	capabilities.	Nevertheless,	this	
is	not	absent	 from	problems.	The	Japanese	side	has	manifested	some	difficulty	 for	 the	EU	to	establish	
	  19）	This	aspect	was	addressed	at	the	conference	“Addressing	Local	Conflicts	Before	They	Turn	Global	Japan	-	EU	Cooperation”	at	JICA	Research	
Institute,	Tokyo,	on	21	February	2012.
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cooperation	among	equal	partners,	since	the	EU	as	an	international	actor	is	overly	focused	on	norm-exporting	
and	conditionality	policies.	Additionally,	and	as	it	was	the	case	with	the	Chinese	perceptions,	Japan	also	sees	
the	EU	as	a	complex	and	bureaucratized	machinery	who	is	often	more	ineffective	to	cooperate	with,	thus	not	
minimizing	the	importance	to	continue	the	cooperation	with	the	core	EU-Member	States.	Moreover,	before	
the	eyes	of	Japan,	the	lack	of	a	clear	EU	strategy	for	Asia	and	the	increasing	efforts	vested	into	the	partnership	
with	China	have	occasionally	originated	misunderstandings	and	concerns	(e.g.	such	as	 in	 the	case	of	 the	
proposal	to	lift	the	EU	arms	embargo	on	China)	and	have	raised	questions	on	what	is	the	true	added	value	of	
EU-Japanese	cooperation,	on	the	need	of	clarifying	the	goals	sought	for	this	partnership	and	what	kind	of	
partner	the	EU	is	to	become	in	Asia,	particularly	considering	that	the	Japanese	priority	continues	to	be	a	solid	
alliance	with	the	US	to	ensure	its	national	security.20）
(2) OUTCOMES AND STRUCTURES
	 In	 line	of	what	has	been	detailed	 in	 the	 first	part	of	 this	paper,	 the	cooperation	outcomes	 that	have	
successfully	been	achieved	 in	contrast	with	 the	 identified	priorities	and	objectives	vary	case	by	case.	
Arguably,	the	EU-Japan	Partnership	has	maintained	a	more	stable	and	balanced	profile	during	the	two	decades	
of	 institutionalized	cooperation	than	the	partnership	with	China.	EU-Japan	relations	have	not	been	free	of	
misunderstandings	or	periods	when	the	smooth	relations	have	cooled	down	as	 in	 the	remarkable	case	of	
proposal	for	 lifting	the	arms	embargo	on	China.	However,	 the	magnitude	of	such	punctual	frictions	is	not	
comparable	with	major	shocks	such	as	the	Tiananmen	events	of	1989	in	the	EU-China	relations.	Nevertheless,	
both	partnerships	still	need	to	catch	up	in	matching	rhetoric	with	actual	results,	and	arguably,	the	EU-China	
relations	to	a	greater	extent.	In	historical	perspective,	cooperation	achieved	within	the	EU-Japan	framework,	
although	modest,	has	gone	further	than	that	between	the	EU	and	China,	especially	when	it	comes	to	matters	
related	to	Human	Security	and	particularly	the	operations	in	Cambodia,	Afghanistan,	et	cetera	(Hook,	et	al.,	
2011,	pp.	292-303).	In	the	case	of	EU-China	relations,	actual	cooperation	in	political	and	security	issues	was	
achieved	 initially	with	 the	Chinese	participation	on	project	 for	 the	European	satellite	navigation	system	
“Galileo,”	21）	up	to	more	recently	with	the	joint	anti-piracy	operations	in	Somali	waters.	
	 In	both	cases,	 judging	whether	such	a	degree	of	cooperation	is	enough	taking	into	account	 the	myriad	
complexities	of	the	EU	as	a	foreign	and	security	policy	actor,	the	geographical	distance	between	Europe	and	
East-Asia,	as	well	as	 the	 inherent	difficulty	 in	finding	issues	of	 immediate	and	priority	concern	for	both	
parties,	 is	a	matter	that	can	be	left	up	to	subjective	criterion.	Yet,	 the	fact	that	such	levels	do	not	meet	the	
	  20）	An	 important	point	 for	 Japan	 in	 its	 relations	with	 the	EU	has	always	been	 the	 triangulation	of	 relations	US-Japan-EU,	being	 these	
complementary	but	never	substitute	of	the	US-Japan	Security	Alliance.	Therefore,	before	Japanese	eyes,	the	perception	of	what	kind	of	partner	
the	EU	is,	particularly	in	regard	to	the	US	(a	supportive	partner,	anti-American	partner,	etc.),	is	a	crucial	element	in	the	formulation	of	the	
Japanese	EU	policy.
	  21）	A	European	alternative	system	to	the	American	Global	Positioning	System	(GPS).
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designated	objectives	is	a	fact	recognized	and	debated	by	most	of	 the	existing	literature	on	both	Strategic	
Partnerships.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	when	 looking	at	 the	existing	political	and	security	dialogues,	as	well	as	
cooperation/coordination	within	multilateral	 fora,	where	 the	most	 common	 results	of	 these	Strategic	
Partnerships	come	to	light:	meetings,	dialogues	and	periodical	joint	statements.	
	 In	this	regard,	it	is	important	to	emphasize	the	fact	that	EU-Japan	and	EU-China	Partnerships	are	managed	
in	the	EU	mainly	in	isolation	from	each	other,	and	that	these	two	partnerships	are	not	coordinated	under	a	
higher	EU-strategy	for	East-Asia,	neither	in	Brussels	nor	in	consultations	between	the	EU	Missions	in	Beijing	
and	Tokyo.22）	Parallel	 to	 this,	 in	both	cases,	 the	bilateral	 relations	directly	with	 the	EU	Member	States	
(particularly	 the	core	ones)	 remain	a	very	 important	aspect	of	European-East-Asian	relations,	specially	
considering	the	difficulties	that	both	China	and	Japan	acknowledge	in	cooperating	with	the	EU	both	due	to	the	
difficulty	for	reaching	consensuses	or	a	common	EU	voice	on	crucial	policy	issues	as	well	as	due	to	 the	
bureaucratic	complexities	of	the	EU.	
	 Placing	emphasis	on	this	last	point,	and	taking	into	account	the	fact	that	the	EU	as	a	foreign	and	security	
policy	actor	is	not	only	a	complex	entity	but	also	that	its	personality	as	an	international	player	is	dependent	on	
the	intergovernmental	mechanisms	of	agreement	(or	disagreement)	among	the	Member	States,	it	is	worth	to	
make	the	reflection	whether	the	EU’s	relations	with	China	and	Japan	would	not	be	better	understood	under	the	
lens	of	 inter-regionalism,	 in	one	of	 its	 forms23）	 (Hänggi,	2000,	pp.	8-10),	 rather	 than	as	normal	bilateral	
relations	between	two	state	actors	as	they	are	often	analyzed	(López	i	Vidal,	2012).	Taking	into	account	the	
limitations	of	the	EU’s	CFSP,	and	seeing	the	EU’s	relations	with	East-Asian	countries	as	part	of	the	network	
of	today’s	global	multilevel	governance,	it	is	possible	to	argue,	first,	that	the	regimes	of	cooperation	that	can	
actually	be	achieved	within	these	frameworks	will	unavoidably	be	either	those	that	can	avoid	being	trapped	in	
the	complexities	of	EU	policy	formation	and	consensus	reaching	due	to	their	pragmatism	or	perceived	high	
utility,	or	those	issues	in	which	a	strong	shared	interests	are	identified	thus	being	less	subjective	to	internal	EU	
disagreements;	and	secondly,	 that	 if	one	considers	these	relations	within	a	framework	of	inter-regionalism	
rather	 than	as	conventional	bilateral	relations,	 the	lack	of	a	coordinated	EU	Strategy	for	East-Asia	with	a	
developed	regional	approach	reveals	 itself	as	an	outstanding	obstacle	for	 the	proper	development	of	both	
partnerships.	In	other	words,	 the	limited	regimes	of	actual	cooperation	that	such	Partnerships	can	lead	to,	
require	taking	into	account	the	regional	dynamics	in	which	the	cooperating	partners	operate	as	well	as	the	
complex	historical	and	political	relations	between	the	two.	In	 this	sense,	 it	 is	understandable	 that	 the	EU	
places	greater	 importance	to	enhance	its	contacts	and	cooperation	with	China,	given	the	relevance	of	 the	
country	in	economic,	demographic,	geostrategic	and	political	terms;	however,	the	fact	that	this	cooperation	
	  22）	Acknowledged	to	the	author	in	an	interview	with	the	Head	of	the	Political	Section	of	the	European	Commission’s	Delegation	to	China	in	Beijing	
in	March	2012.
	  23）	In	its	conceptualization	of	inter-regionalism,	Hänggi	discusses	that	the	relations	between	regional	groupings	and	single	powers	may	constitute	
an	important	component	of	biregional	or	transregional	arrangements	(2000,	p.	7).
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raises	certain	concerns	on	 the	Japanese	side,	which	 is	uncertain	about	a	rapidly	changing	situation	 in	 its	
regional	context	and	pursuing	a	hedging	strategy	towards	China	(López	i	Vidal,	2011),	is	a	matter	that	the	EU	
has	to	take	in	consideration	in	order	to	develop	both	Partnerships	to	their	full	potential	and	move	forward	
from	the	current	rhetoric	trap.	The	way	in	which	this	can	effectively	be	put	into	practice	remains	to	be	seen	
given	 that	 the	current	policies	 towards	China	and	Japan	are	dealt	 in	 isolation	from	each	other.	Either	a	
coordinating	strategy	or	through	a	more	ambitious	engagement	in	multilateral	arrangements	such	as	the	Asia-
Europe	Meeting	(ASEM)	seem	to	be	the	most	appropriate	ways	to	accommodate	the	different	interests	and	
sensibilities	in	the	East-Asian	partners	with	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	EU	to	become	a	more	relevant	actor	
in	the	region.	
(3) CHALLENGES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
	 The	current	and	existing	analysis	of	EU-China	and	EU-Japan	relations	has	acknowledged	and	debated	the	
possible	variables	that	explain	the	emergence	of	the	existing	gaps	between	objectives	and	materialization	of	
cooperation	in	both	partnerships.	Nevertheless,	the	perceptions	that	the	EU	as	an	international	actor	generates	
in	 its	 partners	 is	 an	underexplored	 area,	 the	 further	 knowledge	of	which	 could	bring	 about	 a	 new	
understanding	of	how	the	EU’s	profile	in	this	region	could	be	improved	and	cooperation	more	effective.	At	the	
same	time,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	EU-China	Partnership,	while	it	poses	many	substantial	challenges,	is	
the	true	proof	of	fire	for	the	EU	to	consolidate	its	personality	as	an	international	actor,	and	the	one	that	may	
have	greater	potential	 to	accelerate	 the	process	of	European	integration	in	such	policy	areas.	How	such	a	
challenge	 is	perceived	by	Brussels	 is	a	factor	 that	will	need	 to	be	further	 looked	upon	in	order	 to	better	
understand	the	reasoning	and	motivation	behind	the	EU’s	increased	interest	 in	engaging	particularly	with	
China.	
	 Finally,	further	understanding	the	‘Europeanization’	factor	may	shed	further	light	in	disclosing	which	is	the	
true	added	value,	at	the	eyes	of	the	East-Asian	partners,	for	enhancing	its	relations	with	the	EU	besides	their	
respective	bilateral	links	with	the	EU	Member	States.	In	this	sense,	both	Japan	and	China	have	a	long	history	
of	bilateral	 relations	with	 the	core	EU	Member	States,	and	a	successful	 record	of	cooperation	and	good	
relations	in	the	past.	Nevertheless,	the	EU	may	be	serving	Japan	and	China	with	the	function	of	becoming	a	
framework	for	improving	the	relations	with	the	smaller,	peripheral	Member	States	or	with	those	who	do	not	
have	a	long	history	of	relations	with	Japan	or	China.	In	the	same	sense,	 it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	
relations	of	such	countries	with	China	and	Japan	have	been	Europeanized,	and	most	specially	those	that	have	
gained	political	independence	within	the	last	two	decades	or	that	did	not	have	a	history	of	diplomatic	relations	
with	East-Asian	countries,	or	whether,	on	the	contrary,	such	relations	have	developed	newly	in	a	traditionally	
bilateral	fashion.	
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
	 This	article	has	reviewed	the	EU’s	involvement	in	East-Asian	political	and	security	affairs	has	evolved	
through	the	Strategic	Partnerships	with	China	and	Japan,	and	how	it	has	maintained	a	low	profile	during	the	
two	decades	of	 formalized	cooperation.	Such	 low	profile	 is	explained	by	a	series	of	gaps	between	 the	
objectives	set	for	cooperation	and	its	actual	materialization	in	joint	action	or	policy,	which	have	its	origin	both	
in	the	complexity	of	the	EU’s	personality	as	a	foreign	and	security	policy	actor	as	well	as	in	the	perceptions	
that	the	EU	generates	in	its	partners	as	a	global	actor.	Nevertheless,	through	the	recognition	of	these	gaps,	the	
need	for	a	more	pragmatic	turn	in	order	to	close	the	existing	deficiencies	has	been	acknowledged,	although	for	
this	task	to	be	successfully	carried	out,	a	better	understanding	of	the	perceptions,	expectations	and	capabilities	
of	the	EU	as	a	foreign	actor	at	the	eyes	of	China	and	Japan	is	necessary.	At	the	same	time,	the	added	value	of	
the	EU	for	such	partners	in	political	and	security	issues	remains	to	be	better	outlined,	and	it	may	be	better	
understood	through	the	lens	of	inter-regionalism	rather	than	as	conventional	bilateral	relations.	In	order	to	
gain	this	understanding,	and	to	meet	the	desired	increases	in	terms	of	effectiveness	and	smoother	cooperation,	
not	only	political	commitment	and	will	but	also	further	research	and	involvement	of	the	academic	community	
will	be	required.
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